Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction Among Chess Players by Steven D. Levitt et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
CHECKMATE: EXPLORING BACKWARD INDUCTION AMONG CHESS PLAYERS
Steven D. Levitt
John A. List
Sally E. Sadoff
Working Paper 15610
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15610
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
December 2009
We would like to thank Martin Dufwenberg, Philip Reny, five anonymous referees, and especially,
the editor Vince Crawford for insightful comments that improved the study.  Trevor Gallen and Elizabeth
Sadoff provided truly outstanding research assistance on the ground.  Min Sok Lee, Lint Barrage, Tova
Levin, Nicholas Simmons and Yana Peysakhovich also provided able research assistance.  Affiliations:
Steven Levitt and John List: University of Chicago, Department of Economics and National Bureau
of Economic Research; Sally Sadoff: University of Chicago, Department of Economics.  Mailing address:
1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637.  Please direct all correspondence to Sally Sadoff. The views
expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Steven D. Levitt, John A. List, and Sally E. Sadoff. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction Among Chess Players
Steven D. Levitt, John A. List, and Sally E. Sadoff
NBER Working Paper No. 15610
December 2009
JEL No. C9,C91,C92,C93,D01
ABSTRACT
Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found
that agents are not able to successfully backward induct.  Much of this evidence, however, is generated
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games – that are pure tests of backward induction.  We find that world class chess players behave like
student subjects in the centipede game, virtually never playing the backward induction equilibrium
In the race to 100 games, in contrast, we find that many chess players properly backward induct.
Consistent with our claim that the Centipede game is not a useful test of backward induction, we find
no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance
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I. Introduction 
 
It is difficult to overstate the profound impact that game theory has had on the economic 
approach and on the sciences more generally.  For that reason, understanding how closely the 
assumptions that underpin game theoretic analysis conform to actual human decision-making is a 
question of first-order importance to economists.  In this spirit, backward induction represents 
one of the most basic concepts in game theory.  Backward induction played a prominent role in 
Reinhard Selten’s (1965) development of perfect equilibrium, and it has helped to shape the 
modern refinement literature.  Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, 
existing empirical evidence suggests that economic agents engage in backward induction less 
frequently than theorists might hope.   
Backward induction has fared especially poorly in the centipede game, which was 
introduced by Robert W. Rosenthal (1981) and has since been extensively analyzed (Kenneth G. 
Binmore, 1987; Philip J. Reny, 1988; Robert J. Aumann, 1988; David M. Kreps, 1990; Geir B. 
Asheim and Martin Dufwenberg, 2003).  The original centipede game is a two-player, finite-
move game in which the subjects alternate choosing whether to end the game or to pass to the 
other player.  The subject’s payoff to ending the game at a particular node is greater than the 
payoff he receives if the other player ends the game at the next node, but less than the payoff 
earned if the other player elects not to end the game.  The player making the final choice gets 
paid more from stopping than from passing, and thus would be expected to stop.  If the opponent 
will stop at the last node, then conditional on reaching the penultimate node, the player 
maximizes his earnings by stopping at that node.  Following this logic further, backward 
induction leads to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium: the game is stopped at the first node.   2
As pointed out in prior research (Rosenthal, 1981, Aumann, 1992, Richard D. McKelvey 
and Thomas R. Palfrey, 1992, Mark Fey, McKelvey, and Palfrey, 1996, and Klaus G. Zauner, 
1999), there are many reasons why players might take actions in the centipede game that diverge 
from that prescribed by backward induction.  Players may face an aversion to the loss of a 
potential surplus.  They may have social preferences for fairness, altruism, or cooperation; or, 
they may believe that enough other players in the population have these preferences that 
continuing the game becomes the optimal rational strategy (Aumann, 1995).  Similarly, there 
may be enough players in the population who make backward induction errors that continuing 
the game becomes the optimal rational strategy.  Reny (1992) notes that, even if common belief 
of expected utility maximization holds at the initial node, it cannot hold after the first player 
passes and therefore subsequent play need not conform to backward induction.  That being the 
case, passing at the first stage can be perfectly rational.
1  Because of the myriad reasons for 
choosing not to stop in the centipede game, it is difficult to determine why stopping at the first 
node is so rare empirically—is it due to a failure to reason backward or for one of these other 
reasons?   
These demanding assumptions induced McKelvey and Palfrey (1992 p. 803) to choose 
the centipede game for their seminal experiment exploring alternative models since they wished 
to “intentionally choose an environment in which we expect Nash equilibrium to perform at its 
worst.”  The game did not disappoint McKelvey and Palfrey, and it has consistently produced 
outcomes that depart radically from the predictions of Nash equilibrium (Rosemarie C. Nagel 
                                                 
1For more thorough discussions of the relationship between common knowledge of rationality and backward 
induction, see Aumann (1995), Elchanan Ben-Porath (1997), Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003), and Pierpaolo 
Battigalli and Marciano Siniscalchi (1999).  Aumann (1992 p. 220) summarizes the skepticism towards backward 
induction in this setting eloquently, arguing that most people would say “if this is rationality, they want none of it.” 
   3
and Fang F. Tang, 1988; Fey, McKelvey, and Palfrey, 1996; Zauner, 1999; Amnon Rapoport et 
al., 2003; Gary Bornstein, Tamar Kugler, and Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2004).   
A notable exception to this pattern of results is the work of Ignacio Palacios-Huerta and 
Oscar Volij (2009), in which nearly 70 percent of their professional chess players stop the game 
at the first node when matched with other chess players, compared to the roughly 5% of subjects 
who stop in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992).  Furthermore, in their artefactual field experiment 
every single chess Grandmaster who is given the chance to end the game on the first move does 
so when his opponent is known to be another chess player.  When chess players are matched 
against students in the lab, they less frequently stop at the first node.  Palacios-Huerta and Volij 
(2009 p. 1624, 1634) attribute the results to chess players “not satisy(ing) even the minimal 
departures from common knowledge of rationality that may induce rational players to depart 
from backward induction” because “[b]ackward induction reasoning is second nature to expert 
chess players.”  Further, they note that “[i]t is the rationality of a subject and his assessment of 
the opponent’s rationality, rather than altruism or other forms of social preferences” that is 
critical to determining whether backward induction will prevail. 
Another strand of the experimental literature on backward induction analyzes games that 
attempt to untangle backward induction from assumptions about rationality and interdependent 
preferences (see, e.g. Binmore et al., 2002; Eric J. Johnson et al, 2002; Uri Gneezy, Aldo 
Rustichini, and Alexander Vostroknutov, 2007; and Dufwenberg, Ramya Sundaram, and David 
J. Butler, 2008).
2 Dufwenberg, Sundaram, and Butler (2008), and Gneezy, Rustichini, and 
Vostroknutov (2007) analyze zero-sum winner-take-all extensive form perfect information 
                                                 
2 This research finds that assumptions about rationality and social preferences cannot fully explain departures from 
Nash equilibrium predictions (e.g., Binmore et al., 2002 and Johnson et al, 2002). Evidence of learning suggests that 
initial failures to backward induct may be due to cognitive limitations (Johnson et al, 2002; Gneezy, Rustichini, and 
Vostroknutov, 2007; and Dufwenberg, Sundaram, and Butler, 2008).     4
games with dominant strategies.  Behavior in these games does not depend on social preferences 
or beliefs about the rationality of one’s opponent.  This allows for a purer measure of players’ 
ability to recognize and implement backward induction strategies.  
Our analysis brings these two strands of the literature together.  Motivated by the 
remarkable findings of Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009), we use professional chess players as 
subjects playing against other chess players, arguably giving backward induction its best chance 
to emerge.  We conduct standard centipede games, as well as presenting results from two 
extremely demanding constant sum, winner-take-all “race to 100” games.  As Judith D. Sally and 
Paul D. Sally (2003) discuss, Race to 100 is a traditional number game that involves two players 
who alternate choosing numbers within a given range (in our two games, either from 1 to 10 or 1 
to 9).  These numbers are added in sequence until one player chooses a number that makes the 
sum exactly equal to 100.
3  This player is the winner and receives a preset amount while the loser 
receives nothing.  Similar to the games in Gneezy, Rustichini, and Vostroknutov (2007) and 
Dufwenberg, Sundaram, and Butler (2008), the optimal strategy in race to 100 does not depend 
on beliefs about other players or on distributional preferences because it is a constant sum, 
winner-take-all game.  The dominant strategy implied by backward induction is robust to all but 
the most extreme types of preferences.
4  In contrast to Gneezy, Rustichini, and Vostroknutov 
                                                 
3 The game we use is in the spirit of the games described in Sally and Sally (2003), and similar to the race game 
described in Gneezy, Rustichini, and Vostroknutov (2007). They denote the game by G(m, k) where players can 
choose any number between 1 and k and the winner is the first to make the sum equal to m. We study G(100, 10) 
and G(100, 9) (beginning at zero). Gneezy, Rustichini, and Vostroknutov (2007) study G(15, 3) and G(17, 4) 
(beginning at one).  Our race to 100 games share similarities with a set of games known as “Nim” that have been 
analyzed in the the mathematics literature (see, e.g., Charles Bouton (1901-02); Richard Sprague, (1935-1936), and 
Philip Grundy (1939)) 
4 Unless, of course, the player values the utility of her opponent more than her own utility.    5
(2007) and Dufwenberg, Sundaram, and Butler (2008), which require four and six steps of 
reasoning respectively to solve, race to 100 requires the player to reason backwards ten moves.
5 
In the Centipede game, our results for chess professionals are sharply at odds with those 
reported in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) when chess players face one another in an 
artefactual field experiment.  For instance, in our sample, chess players end the game at the first 
node in only 3.9 percent of the games, compared to 69 percent for Palacios-Huerta and Volij 
(2009) in their artefactual field experiment.  And, importantly, not a single one of the sixteen 
Grandmasters in our experiment stop at the first node, whereas all twenty-six of the 
Grandmasters in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) stopped at the first node.  Overall, chess 
players in our sample behave almost exactly like standard subject pools in centipede.   
Our race to 100 results suggest that failure to stop at the first node in centipede has little 
to do with an inability to reason backwards.  In the version of race to 100 in which players 
choose numbers between 1 and 9, nearly 60 percent of the chess players achieve the Nash 
solution.  Yet, among those subjects who perfectly backward induct in race to 100, not a single 
one stopped at the first node in centipede.  Indeed, the “best inductors” in the race to 100 game 
had low stoppage rates in centipede at any node: passing nearly 84 percent of the time.   
Interestingly, this passing rate was almost identical to the rate exhibited by subjects who had no 
skill at backward induction in the race to 100 game.  Finally, we find that small variations in the 
race to 100 game (the only difference being whether players choose numbers in the range 1 to 
10, rather than in the range 1 to 9) influence play considerably.
6  This result suggests that the 
                                                 
5 The problem faced by a player is somewhat easier than it might first appear, however, because the player only 
needs to think back on his own moves, but does not need to solve for his opponent’s optimal move.  In this way, we 
are not testing for backward induction in the strict sense.  Avinash K. Dixit (2005 p. 207) refers to this as a “rollback 
equilibrium.”   
6 Binmore et al. (2002 p. 87) similarly find that backward induction behavior is sensitive to small changes in games 
that are unfamiliar to players. They conclude that “backward induction would be compelling in the classical view of   6
ability to transfer backward induction prowess from the chess board to experimental games is 
quite sensitive to the particulars of the game in question.    
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the experimental 
design, including a more detailed description of the backward induction games, the subject pool, 
and the experimental procedure.  Section 3 discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.   
II.  Experimental Design 
Following the bulk of the literature and Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009), we study a 
version of the Centipede game that has exponentially increasing total payouts, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.  In Figure 1, at each node, the payoffs for player I (“White”) appear in the top row and 
the payoffs for player II (“Black”) appear in the bottom row.  Player I is the first mover. If he 
chooses to stop the game at the first node, player I receives $4 and player II receives $1.  If 
player I chooses to continue the game at the first node, then it becomes player II’s turn to move. 
If player II chooses to stop the game at the second node, player I receives $2 and player II 
receives $8.  If he chooses to continue the game, it becomes player I’s turn to move.  The game 
continues until one player chooses “Stop” or the game reaches the final node. If the game 
reaches the final node, player I receives $256 and player II receives $64.   
While the subgame perfect equilibrium predicts that player I choose “Stop” on his first 
move, few research subjects follow this strategy (Nagel and Tang, 1988; McKelvey and Palfrey, 
1992; Fey, McKelvey, and Palfrey, 1996; Zauner, 1999; Rapoport et al., 2003; Bornstein, 
Kugler, and Ziegelmeyer, 2004).
7  As mentioned earlier, the literature has documented numerous 
reasons why players may choose to continue the game.   
                                                                                                                                                             
game theory, in which games are complete, literal representations of strategic interaction. But game theory is 
typically used not as a literal description but as a model of more complicated strategic interaction.” 
7 For a learning theory that models the influence of experience on end behavior in finite games we direct the reader 
to the seminal paper of Selten and Rolf Stoecker (1986).  As the model suggests, such behavior is a general   7
A more direct test of backward induction is the race to 100 game.  In this game, two 
players alternate choosing numbers within a given range.  These numbers are added in sequence 
until one player chooses a number that makes the sum exactly equal to 100 (beginning from 
zero).  This player is the winner and receives $10, whereas the other player receives nothing.  We 
played two variants of the race to 100 game: one in which players could choose numbers from 1-
9 inclusive, and the other in which they could choose from 1-10 inclusive.  In the 1-9 version, the 
second mover has the advantage:  proper backward induction ensures victory for player II.  This 
holds because choosing whatever number yields a sum of 10, and subsequently choosing the 
numbers that add to 20, 30, 40, …, 80, 90, 100 provides a guaranteed win for player II.   In the 1-
10 game, however, the first mover controls her own destiny since important sums are 1, 12, 23, 
34,…, 78, 89, 100. If one player fails to backwardly induct properly on any move, the other 
player can guarantee victory by reaching one of those key numbers and then acting properly 
thereafter.  
The race game’s dominant strategy, constant-sum, winner-take-all reward structure 
eliminates concerns about loss of potential surplus, one’s own social preferences, beliefs about 
others’ social preferences, and beliefs about others’ ability to backwardly induct.  Consequently, 
play in the race games more clearly maps to tests of backward induction than do choices in the 
centipede game.  In this manner, our approach of linking individual play across the centipede and 
race games is in the spirit of Binmore et al. (2002), who break backward induction into its 
components, subgame consistency and truncation consistency, via experimental methods. 
                                                                                                                                                             
phenomenon, and empirically can be found in games related to the centipede variant.  For example, Johnson et al. 
(2002) compare two explanations of why deviations from perfect equilibrium occur in three-round bargaining 
games.  They report that both explanations—limited cognition and social preferences—play a role.  The authors 
propose an extensive form level-k explanation for their data.  Taking this idea to centipede games, Toshiji Kawagoe 
and Hirokazu Tazikawa (2008) show that level-k analysis provides consistently good predictions for individual 
behavior. 
   8
A.  Subject Pool 
We recruited chess players at two international open chess tournaments that took place in 
the spring and summer of 2008 in the US: the Chicago Open in Wheeling, IL (May 23-26) and 
the World Open in Philadelphia, PA (July 1-6).
8  While anyone entered in the tournaments was 
eligible to participate, we concentrated our recruiting efforts on highly ranked players.   
The World Chess Federation (FIDE) and the United States Chess Federation (USCF) 
rank chess players using the Elo rating method.
9  That rating, combined with achievements in 
selected tournaments, qualify players for official titles.  The Grandmaster (GM) title is the 
highest title a chess player can receive.  It is followed in prestige by the International Master 
(IM) title; the Federation Master and the USCF Master follow – two approximately equal titles, 
with the former awarded by the FIDE and the latter awarded by the USCF.  We categorize 
players who hold one or both of these titles as Masters.
10  Typically, GMs have an Elo rating 
above 2,500, IMs above 2,400, and Masters above 2,200.  The experiment also included players 
who hold no title.  We divide these players into two categories: those with a rating above 2,000 
and those with a rating below 2,000.  Strong club players have an Elo rating of about 1,800.   
Table 1 summarizes the titles and ratings of the subjects in our study.  Our sample 
consists of 206 chess players (103 pairs): 26 GMs, 20 IMs, 61 Masters, 46 players with no chess 
title rated above 2,000 and 53 players with no chess title rated below 2,000.  The first movers 
                                                 
8 Total prize money for the Chicago Open was $100,000 with a top prize of $10,000.  Total prize money for the 
World Open was $400,000 with a top prize of $30,000.  The average prize money payout to high rated players in 
these tournaments is a few hundred dollars, roughly equal to the entrance fee the tournaments charge.  The hourly 
wage earned by players in our experiment was well above the implied hourly wage from participating in the 
tournament.  
9 Players may have both a FIDE and USCF rating. Ratings for a given player will not be identical since these ratings 
are based on their performance in tournaments sanctioned by either FIDE or the USCF. For more information about 
the rating system, see the FIDE Handbook (2008) Section B.02.10 or the USCF Handbook (2008). 
10 A player may hold both a Federation Master title and a USCF Master title at the same time.  Players earn these 
titles based on their performance in tournaments sanctioned by either FIDE or the USCF.   9
consisted of 16 GMs, 12 IMs, 33 Masters, 18 players with no chess title rated above 2,000 and 
24 players with no chess title rated below 2,000.    
B.  Experimental Procedure 
At each tournament, we rented two conference rooms in the hotels where the tournaments 
were held to conduct the experiments.
11  We ran the experiment with pairs of chess players who 
remained anonymous to one another.  We informed each player that they would be participating 
in a game that requires two players who take turns in sequence, and that the other player was 
receiving the same instructions in another room.  While participants did not know each other’s 
identity, it is likely they assumed, given the context of the tournament, that they were paired with 
other chess players.  Each pair played three rounds: one round of centipede and two rounds of 
race to 100 (one round of the 1-9 variant and one round of the 1-10 variant).
  We randomized 
whether centipede or race to 100 was played first, and likewise within the race to 100 game, 
whether the 1-9 or 1-10 variant was done first.
12  We randomly assigned each player the role of 
player I (“White”) or player II (“Black”), and those roles were maintained throughout all three 
rounds.
13  Players did not know how many games they would play or that they would remain as 
either the first mover or the second mover.  At the beginning of round two and round three, we 
informed players that they would be playing another game with the same player and that they 
would remain in the same mover role.  The order in which the games were played does not 
appear to affect play in the centipede game, but does influence actions in the race to 100 game, 
as we discuss later.  
                                                 
11 We ran the experiment while the tournament was occurring.  The players generally participated between 
tournament rounds or during a round if their game ended early or if they took a bye.  In some cases, players in 
contention to win the tournament requested to participate immediately after the tournament ended. 
12 Due to time constraints, one pair stopped early and did not play the centipede game; another pair stopped early 
and did not play race 1-10. 
13 The one exception to random assignment was that we were more likely to assign Grandmasters at the Chicago 
Open to the role of player I. We did this to ensure that we could observe at least one move for Grandmasters in the 
centipede game.    10
Before each game, experimenters gave players a copy of written instructions for the game 
and read aloud from a cue card.  In order to prevent collusion, players communicated their 
decisions via Instant Message on computers operated by the experimenters.  During each game, 
players recorded their own decisions and the decisions of the other player as they occurred.
14 
After the third round, we asked players to fill out a short survey.  Immediately following the 
experiment, we paid players their earnings from all three games privately in cash.
15  
The astute reader will note that we attempted to follow the field experimental design in 
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) as closely as possible.  For example, we directly informed 
subjects that they would be playing each game only once, as they did.  This is an attempt, in the 
spirit of Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Vincent Crawford (2006), to study strategic thinking in an 
environment without learning.  And, at no time did we mention other games that subjects might 
be playing later in the experiment, thus the game played first is the strategic analog to a one-shot 
game.   
One difference between our design and the field design of Palacios-Huerta and Volij 
(2009) is that our subjects play both the centipede game and the race to 100 games with the same 
partner.  The fact that we have some subjects play the centipede game first while other subjects 
play the centipede game after the race games permits a test of learning across domains.  In 
practice, we find that learning is minimal (i.e., ordering does not matter) across the centipede 
game and the race to 100 games.   
We should be clear that while our centipede game represents a direct replication of the 
artefactual field experiment in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009), in no way are we trying to 
                                                 
14 In the race to 100 games, subjects recorded the number chosen and current sum at the end of each turn.  The 
experimenters confirmed that players had correctly recorded these numbers before proceeding with play. 
15 See the online Appendix for a copy of the written instructions, the cue cards read aloud by experimenters, and the 
survey.    11
replicate their lab experiment.  The latter used a random re-matching design, had each subject 
play ten centipede games, and varied opponent type—chess players versus other chess players, 
chess players versus students, and students versus students.  Such an approach permits an 
analysis of questions beyond those of direct import herein. 
III.  Experimental Results 
Table 2 and Figure 2 present results on the probability of stopping at each node in the 
centipede game, conditional upon reaching that node.  The top row in Table 2 pools data across 
players; the remaining rows parse the data according to the chess ranking of the player making a 
decision at the node.  Each column in the table corresponds to a different node.  Looking first at 
the results pooling all players, we find that stop probabilities are low at early nodes and generally 
increase over the course of the game.  For example, in only 3.9 percent of the 102 pairs does the 
player stop the game at the first node.   
Figure 2 reveals that roughly 10 percent of the games end at the second node.  Nearly 45 
percent of the games make it to at least node 5 (at which point player 1 gets $64 and player 2 
receives $16).  Remarkably, 37 percent of players who reach the sixth node choose to continue 
the game to the final node (for a sure loss of $64).
16  This result is consistent with many 
underlying motivations, including positive reciprocity—a player who has been generous at 
earlier nodes is rewarded by the opponent at the final node, even though the opponent suffers a 
substantial financial loss in doing so—more general social preferences, and bounded rationality. 
Given the high pass rates observed in the data, passing maximizes expected returns at 
every node except the last one (where passing guarantees a loss).  For instance, in our data the 
average final payoff to player 1 when he elected to pass at the first node was $44.85, compared 
                                                 
16 Among those who played the centipede game before either of the race to 100 games, 1.9 percent of the pairs 
stopped at the first node, 7.7 percent at the second node, and 77 percent made it to at least node 5.  7.7 percent of the 
pairs reached the final node.   12
to a guaranteed $4 from stopping at the first node (average earnings in total were $38.14). These 
results are consistent with previous studies of the centipede game using student subjects.   
In terms of level of chess expertise, it is interesting to note that in sixteen pairs with a 
Grandmaster as player 1, not once did the Grandmaster stop at the first node.  Only one of nine 
Grandmasters who had the chance ended the game at the second node, and in only one of fifteen 
opportunities did a grandmaster end the game at the third node.  The same general pattern is true 
among International Masters, as well as lower ranked players.  Overall, the centipede results for 
our chess sample look very much like the empirical results with standard subject pools and 
strikingly different than the earlier findings on chess players reported in Palacios-Huerta and 
Volij (2009).  
A.  Race to 100 games 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize empirical results for the race to 100 games.  Table 3 splits the 
data according to the first point at which the game is “solved,” where solved means that one 
player gets onto a number that guarantees victory and plays optimally at every move from that 
point onward.  The top two rows in Table 3 show results for the variant of the game in which 
players choose 1 to 9; the bottom two rows correspond to the 1 to 10 treatment.  In each case we 
report both the “key numbers” that ensure victory and the percentage of games that are first 
solved at that particular “key number.” 
The top portion of Table 3 demonstrates that in the 1 to 9 treatment, 57.3 percent of pairs 
solved the game as early as possible (i.e., at the number 10).  By the number twenty, roughly 
two-thirds of the pairs have solved the game.  If the solution is not achieved by then, the game is 
likely not solved until near the end.  Interestingly, the chess players do much worse in the 1 to 10 
treatment:  only 12.6 percent of these cases are solved on the first move (which requires the   13
player to choose 1) and in only roughly 20 percent of cases is there a solution by the second key 
number (which is 12).
17  Remarkably, nearly two-thirds of the 1 to 10 treatment are not solved 
until number 78 or higher.   
We find it striking that even among a subject pool that has extensive experience with 
backward induction, the seemingly minor change of shifting the “key numbers” from numbers 
ending with zero leads to a sharp reduction in success in solving the problem.
18  This result is 
consistent with the power of subtle changes reported in many psychology experiments as well as 
Binmore et al. (2002 p. 87), who find that backward induction behavior of players unfamiliar 
with the game is quite sensitive to minute changes in the game, and also with the findings of 
Adriaan de Groot (1965) regarding the difficulty chess players have in generalizing their skills in 
unfamiliar settings, even within relatively narrow contexts.     
Tables 4a and 4b present empirical results of the race to 100 game in terms of implied 
probabilities of solving the problem, conditional on reaching that point without a solution 
previously being obtained.  Table 4a (4b) shows the 1 to 9 (1 to 10) treatment.  The first column 
of Table 4a corresponds to the first chance a player has to solve the problem (i.e., in the 1 to 9 
variant, the first action by player 2, or the second move by player 1 if player 2 fails to solve the 
problem on the first move).  The other columns map to each of the relevant “key numbers.”  The 
top row of the table provides pooled results, whereas subsequent rows split the data by chess 
ranking.  The number of opportunities that arise at each node is presented in parentheses.   
                                                 
17 These results are consistent with Dufwenberg, Sundaram, and Butler (2008) who find that 14 percent of players 
solve a related game on the first move in the first round of play. Gneezy, Rustichini, and Vostroknutov (2007) do not 
separately report first round results for the race game they analyze.  Yet, pooling the first five rounds of play, they 
find 46.5 percent of players make no errors on the first move.  We should note that, similar to the centipede game 
results discussed above, subjects who play the race games before the centipede game behave similarly to those 
playing the race games after the centipede game. 
18 The null hypothesis of equal probabilities of finding an early solution to the 1 to 9 and 1 to 10 treatments is 
strongly rejected by the data.   14
Overall, in the 1 to 9 treatment, 39 percent of players solve the game on their first move.  
This number is lower than the 57.3 percent of games that are solved by the number 10 because in 
cases where the game is not solved by one player at the first chance, the other player often also 
fails to successfully solve it.
19  If the game is not solved early, then the probability that it is 
solved at a middle node is less than 10 percent.  By the number 80, the hazard rate for solving it 
rises to 24 percent, and by 90, the solution rate is nearly three-quarters.  Grandmasters are the 
group most likely to solve the game on their first chance (50 percent likelihood), but among the 
Grandmasters who fail to solve the game immediately, their performance is weak.  Generally, we 
do not find stark differences in performance across chess rankings. 
Data trajectories in the 1 to 10 game are similar, except that the solution rates early in the 
game are much lower than in the 1 to 9 treatment.  Once again, if a solution is not reached near 
the beginning, it is unlikely that the game will be solved until near the end: about 1 in 5 players 
who reach the 78 node solve it there, and about three-fourths of the players get the right answer 
at 89.  Grandmasters do somewhat better than other chess players with respect to finding an early 
solution to the 1 to 10 game, but a test of the null hypothesis that Grandmasters have the same 
probability of solving this game at the first opportunity is rejected only at the p < 0.10 level. 
To explore whether learning takes place within the course of the experiment, we examine 
whether the proportion of games solved at each stage of the race to 100 depends upon whether 
this is the first or second race to 100 game for the players (recall that every subject plays both the 
1 to 9 and the 1 to 10 version).  As shown in the bottom two rows of Table 5, when the 1 to 10 
game is played after the 1 to 9 game, performance in the 1 to 10 game is improved.  A solution is 
reached by the key number 12 nearly 30 percent of the time if players first see the 1 to 9 game, 
                                                 
19 Note also that it is possible for neither player to solve the game on the first try, but for the game to be solved at 10 
if both players’ first actions are low numbers, and then the third number selected solves the problem.  This happens 
in one instance in the data.   15
compared to roughly half that rate if they have not.  This difference is statistically significant at 
the p < 0.01 level.  Interestingly, the top two rows of the table demonstrate that when the 1 to 9 
game is played second, performance on the 1 to 9 game actually diminishes slightly relative to 
when the 1 to 9 game is played first, with that difference statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
In contrast to the 1 to 9 game, in the 1 to 10 variant the solution frequently comes very late in the 
game, and players do not appear to generalize from the fact that the game can be solved by 
backward induction once the numbers are close to 100 to the broader lesson that this class of 
games is susceptible to backward induction from the very first move.   
One explanation for these differences across games is that the pattern that emerges from 
the backward induction approach in the 1 to 9 game is easily recognizable: 60, 70, 80, 90, 100.  
To a player who is not using backward induction initially, the fact that the opponent always 
chooses a number that ends on zero and wins using that strategy sends a strong cue as to the 
nature of the solution to the game.  In contrast, the pattern of choices in the 1 to 10 game is much 
less obvious: 56, 67, 78, 89, 100.  A player could ride the backward induction strategy to victory 
without the opponent even recognizing that there was a pattern to the first player’s actions.
20 
Interestingly, we also find some evidence that playing the centipede game first interferes 
with solving the 1 to 10 game.  If race to 100 is played first, 20.2% of pairs solve the 1 to 10 
game on the first move (i.e., by choosing 1). This percentage drops to 5.88% when centipede is 
played first. Similarly, the percentage of games solved on the final node (i.e., 89) increases from 
33.3 percent to 55.9 percent when race to 100 is played first and second, respectively.  The effect 
                                                 
20 Using a related game, Dufwenberg, Sundaram, and Butler (2008) find that playing an easier variant before a 
harder one increases the probability that players will first recognize that there is an analytic solution and second will 
solve for the dominant strategy (there, the easier variant required fewer steps of reasoning than the harder variant). 
However, in contrast to our results, they do not find that playing the harder variant first hurts play in the easier 
variant.  This may be because the easier variant only requires two steps of reasoning.  Gneezy, Rustichini, and 
Vostroknutov (2007) also find that learning takes place over the course of repeated race games, with subjects 
switching from forward induction to backward induction as experience increases.  Although their subjects played 
race games of varying difficulty, they do not discuss the effect of game order on performance.   16
on the 1 to 9 game is similar in direction but the differences are small.  One explanation for this 
result is that the players see centipede as a game of cooperation as opposed to a backward 
induction game, which interferes with their ability to conceptualize the race to 100 game as a 
backward induction game.
21   
B.  Is skill at backward induction correlated with stopping early in the centipede game? 
  As noted earlier, there are many reasons why a player in the centipede game might not 
choose to stop the game.  Inability to backward induct is one of those explanations.
22  Using 
performance in the race to 100 game as a measure of skill at backward induction, we are able to 
test whether those who successfully backward induct in the race to 100 game are more likely to 
stop at a given node in the centipede game. 
  There are 15 players in our sample who backward inducted perfectly in the race to 100 
games, i.e. they made the optimal backward induction strategy every chance they were given in 
both games.  The top row of Table 6 reports the probability that these 15 players stop at each 
node in the centipede game, conditional on reaching that node.  The number of times each node 
is reached is shown in parentheses.  Despite the fact that these 15 players proved themselves 
adept at backward induction in the race to 100 games, not once out of ten opportunities did they 
choose to stop at the first node in the centipede game.  At nodes two through four, these players 
never stopped the game more than 25 percent of the time.  At node five, they stopped two out of 
three times.  Tellingly, on the two occasions in which they reached node six, these players 
elected to pass both times, even though no backward induction whatsoever is required to see that 
passing at the last node lowers one’s own payoff, suggesting that other forces, such as social 
                                                 
21 Another explanation is subject fatigue. 
22 Because the subjects play each game variant only once, our measure of backward induction ability captures 
players’ ability to backward induct in response to a novel situation rather than their ability to learn the backward 
induction strategy over the course of repeated play.   17
preferences, are at work.  Despite demonstrated ability to backward induct flawlessly in the race 
to 100 games, this group of players elected to stop the centipede game in only 17 percent of the 
opportunities that they faced.  These results argue against interpreting failure to stop in the 
centipede game as evidence of an inability of an individual to backward induct. 
  The second row of Table 6 shows results for players who exhibited some backward 
induction ability in the race games, although they did not play those games perfectly.  These 
“Second-best” inductors are players who solved one race to 100 game on their first move or 
solved both race to 100 games before the last node, but made at least one mistake in those games.  
Sixty-six subjects fit this classification.  Similar to the best inductors, these players rarely 
stopped the centipede game at early nodes.  Not once in 17 opportunities did they stop at node 1 
when given the opportunity, and in only 10.6 percent of the cases did they stop at the second 
node.
23  These players were more likely than the perfect inductors to stop centipede at other 
nodes, and overall stopped the centipede game in 31 percent of the chances they were given. 
  Our third classification of players includes those who did not qualify for the top two 
categories for backward induction, but did solve at least one of the race to 100 games prior to the 
last node.  Thirty six players fell into this category.  These subjects play centipede much like the 
second best inductors, with an overall stopping rate of 32 percent. 
  The last group of players includes those who did not solve either of the race to 100 games 
prior to the final node.  Nearly forty percent of our subjects fall into this category.  Interestingly, 
this set of players, who showed no proficiency for backward induction, played the centipede 
game most like the perfect backward inductors, passing at very high rates.  In sum, we find no 
                                                 
23 These second best inductors have many more opportunities at the second node than the first node because the 
most common way to qualify was to solve correctly the 1 to 9 version of the race to 100 game on the first move.  In 
order to have that chance, one had to be a second mover in that game, and if you were a second mover in one game, 
you moved second in all games.     18
evidence that stopping in the centipede game is systematically related to backward induction 
performance in the race to 100 games, calling into question the validity of using centipede games 
to draw inferences about backward induction. 
IV.  Conclusion 
In this study, we explore the behavior of world class chess players in complementary 
games that lend insights into backward induction prowess.  We find that these players exhibit 
substantial abilities to backward induct in games appropriate for tests of backward induction, but 
do not choose the backward induction solution in the centipede game.  This behavior cannot 
easily be attributed to an inability to backward induct since it is uncorrelated with demonstrated 
backward induction ability in the more appropriate tests of backward induction.   
Indeed, given the actual play of opponents, such cooperative behavior in the centipede 
game is wealth maximizing.  One explanation for this high degree of cooperation in our 
experiment is that cooperative arrangements are common in tournament chess.  For example, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that it is common for chess players to agree to a draw (tie) prior to a 
game towards the end of tournaments when such collusive behavior is jointly beneficial.  Chess 
players also report agreeing in advance of games to 60-40 splits (60% of tournament payoffs to 
the game winner, 40% to the loser) in order to reduce the variance of payoffs.
24  
                                                 
24 Consistent with such behavior, in our own experiment one Grandmaster, aware that his opponent was likely 
another chess player at this tournament, offered the following unsolicited opinion to describe his rationale in the 
centipede game: “If this man were my enemy and he would use the money to hurt me, then I would stop. But this 
man is my friend. I can trust him. I will continue.”  He reached the final node.    19
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Figure 1: Centipede Game Payoff Structure  
 
 
Figure 1 displays the centipede game payoff structure.  A stop in each round results in player I receiving the top payoff, and player II 
receiving the bottom.  The player whose turn it is marked in the circle. Table 1: Summary of Participants 
   USCF Rating  FIDE Rating  Number of Players 
Grandmasters  2472-2763 2265-2637 26
International Masters  2273-2538 2227-2488 20
FIDE & USCF Masters  2009-2497 2037-2497 61
Other Chess Players > 2000  2000-2610 2026-2531 46
Other Chess Players < 2000  852-2064 1789-2341 53
Total Number  852-2763 1789-2637 206
      
Table 1 reports subject pool results.   Columns correspond to title, the range of USCF 
ratings, FIDE ratings, and subject counts.   1
   2
 
Table 2: Summary of Centipede Results- Implied Stop Probability 
   Node 1  Node 2  Node 3 Node  4 Node  5 Node  6 
All Chess Players  0.039  0.102  0.193  0.352  0.587  0.632 
    (102)  (98) (88) (71) (46) (19) 
Grandmasters  0  0.111  0.067  0  0.636  1 
    (16) (9) (15) (7) (11) (2) 
International Masters  0  0  0.083  0.625  0.625  0 
    (12) (8) (12) (8)  (8)  (1) 
Masters  0.063  0.077  0.259  0.318  0.455  0.5 
    (32) (26) (27) (22) (11)  (8) 
>2000  0.056  0.154  0.154  0.2  0.5  1 
    (18) (26) (13) (15)  (6)  (2) 
<2000  0.042  0.103  0.286  0.526  0.7  0.667 
    (24) (29) (21) (19) (10)  (6) 
Table 2 reports the distribution of implied stop probabilities for players in the 
centipede game.  Columns correspond to the conditional probability that a 
player will stop at that node, given the chance to do so.  Odd nodes refer to 
player one's choices, while even nodes refer to player two's choices.  Number 
of opportunities observed is displayed in parentheses below.   
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Table 3: Summary of Race to 100 Results    
Node at which Game Solved  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 
Number at which Game Solved (1-9)  10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percentage of Time Solved (1-9)  0.573 0.087 0.029 0.039 0.019 0.01 0.029 0.078 0.136
                             
Number at which Game Solved (1-10)  1 12 23 34 45 56 67 78 89
Percentage of Time Solved (1-10)  0.126 0.087 0.019 0.01 0.01 0.029 0.049 0.214 0.447
           
           
Table 3 reports the distribution of nodes at which a race to 100 game was solved.  Rows 1 and 3 report the "key number" from which a 
win may be forced.  Rows 2 and 4 report the percent of the time a corresponding game was solved at that node; a solution is a choice of 
number that summed to a "magic number", in conjunction with never deviating from subsequent "key numbers" afterward.   
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Table 4A: Implied Probabilities 1-9 
    First  10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
All  0.392  0.333  0.147  0.061  0.083  0.048  0.026  0.086  0.242  0.737 
    (158) (3)  (34) (49) (48) (42) (38) (35) (33) (19) 
GM  0.5  .  0  0  0.167  0  0  0  0  0.5 
    (16)  (0) (4) (4) (6) (5) (5) (4) (5) (2) 
IM  0.333  .  0  0.333  0  0  0  0  0.75  . 
    (12)  (0) (4) (3) (4) (4) (2) (2) (4) (0) 
Master  0.422  .  0.4  0  0.077  0.083  0  0.111  0.222  1 
    (45)  (0) (5)  (10)  (13)  (12)  (9) (9) (9) (5) 
>2000  0.357  0.333  0  0.118  0.167  0.091  0.091  0  0  0.6 
    (42)  (3)  (13) (17) (12) (11) (11)  (8)  (6)  (5) 
<2000  0.372  .  0.375  0  0  0  0  0.167  0.333  0.714 
    (43)  (0)  (8)  (15) (13) (10) (11) (12)  (9)  (7) 
            
            
Table 4A reports the distribution of implied probabilities for race to 100 (1-9).  Columns 
correspond to the "key number" from which a win can be forced.  Columns correspond to the 
conditional probability that a player will solve a game at that number, given the chance to do 
so.  Number of opportunities observed is displayed in parentheses below. 
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Table 4B: Implied Probabilities 1-10 
   First  12 23 34 45 56  67 78 89
All  0.098 0.095 0.022 0.008 0.008 0.026  0.047 0.198 0.754
   (193) (21) (91) (120) (125) (116)  (107) (111) (61)
GM  0.2 0 0 0 0.071 0.077  0.1 0.286 0.75
   (25) (2) (5) (16) (14) (13)  (10) (14) (4)
IM  0.105 0.333 0 0 0 0.091  0.083 0.167 1
   (19) (3) (9) (11) (10) (11)  (12) (12) (5)
Master  0.107 0 0.043 0 0 0  0.04 0.226 0.8
   (56) (5) (23) (26) (36) (31)  (25) (31) (20)
>2000  0.024 0.167 0 0 0 0.034  0.103 0.045 0.647
   (42) (6) (21) (36) (36) (29)  (29) (22) (17)
<2000  0.098 0 0 0.031 0 0  0 0.219 0.75
   (51) (5) (28) (32) (28) (32)  (33) (32) (16)
           
           
Table 4B reports the distribution of implied probabilities for race to 100 (1-10).  
Columns correspond to the "key number" from which a win can be forced.  Columns 
correspond to the conditional probability that a player will solve a game at that 
number, given the chance to do so.  Number of opportunities observed is displayed in 
parentheses below. 
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Table 5: Percentage of Games Solved at Each Node 
   1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Race to 100 1-9  10 20 30  40 50 60 70 80 90
     1-9 Played First (N=52)  0.615 0.115 0.038  0.019 0.019 0 0.019 0.058 0.115
     1-9 Played Second (N=51)  0.529 0.059 0.02  0.059 0.02 0.02 0.039 0.098 0.157
Race to 100 1-10  1 12 23  34 45 56 67 78 89
     1-10 Played First (N=51)  0.078 0.059 0  0.02 0 0.059 0.039 0.176 0.569
     1-10 Played Second (N=51)  0.176 0.118 0.039  0 0.02 0 0.059 0.255 0.333
 
 
             
Table 5 reports the distribution of when a race was solved, conditional on the order races were played in.   Columns correspond to the "key 
number" at which a game was solved. One pair of players dropped out after playing the race (1-9) first, which accounts for the differing number of 
observations. 
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Table 6: Centipede Behavior by Induction Ability: Implied Stop Probabilities
    N  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
Best  
15
0 0.2 0.125 0.25 0.667 0
   (10) (5) (8) (4) (3) (2)
Second Best  
66
0 0.106 0.375 0.412 0.571 0.889
   (17) (47) (16) (34) (7) (9)
Second Worst  36 0.1 0.133 0.278 0.417 0.833 1
   (20) (15) (18) (12) (12) (1)
Bad  
87
0.036 0.065 0.109 0.238 0.458 0.429
   (55) (31) (46) (21) (24) (7)
          
Table 6 displays implied stop probability by inductor ability, rather than title for 
players.  Odd numbered columns refer to player one's decisions, even numbered 
columns refer to player two's decisions. 
 